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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

ECONOMICS AND LABOR LAW
BY

I. HERBERT ROTHENBERG*
In order to treat circumspectly with the subject of labor law, one must first
obtain a true perspective of the relation of the subject to other non-legal considerations which are inextricably intertwined with the legal aspects of the subject.
The study of the law of labor relations is not a single pursuit. To merely commit
to memory the phraseology of the several germane statutes or the text of the often
contradictory decisions, or to evaluate their precepts on the basis of delicate
legalistic syllogism is to permit the trees to obscure the forest.
Enveloping, as it does, whole and vast segments of our society and the Nation's incalculably enormous and basic productive equipment and measureably
governing the multifarious and intricate problems arising from their interrelation,
conflicts and development, the law of labor relations should plainly appear to be
a significant and complex study. Indeed, no other collective human activity,
other than War itself, encompasses such huge masses of persons or such inestimable
capital wealth or so directly or so intimately affects the lives, fortunes and welfare
of so many, or, in truth, of the country itself, as do those portentous and partisan
activities with which the law of labor relations concerns itself. Accordingly, the
study of the law of labor relations is not merely a study of law. Nor is it a
study of economics or sociology or philosophy or history. It is all of these and
more.
As it obtains. Federally and throughout the several states, the law of labor
relations has no counterpart in the whole of our body of law. It is not, as are
most other branches of the law, the culmination of human experience. To the
contrary, the law of labor relations is, for the greatest part, novel and experimental.
For the remainder it is diversified, variant and, alternately and according to
geographical climate, runs in advance and behind, and often enough, in the very
teeth of human experience. In its totality, the law of labor relations, has been
and, in the forseeable future, will probably continue to be in a constant state of
undulation and change. Indeed, the form and substance of labor law is in such
a continuing and constant state of flux and vicissitude that uncertainty and unpredictability has seemingly become one of its distinguishing attributes.
The improvident and impolitic state of this extremely important branch of
the law has as its source an underlying condition and circumstance which is universally recognized but rarely ever openly and frankly acknowledged. . and
*Admitted to the Philadelphia Bar 1935, after reading law in the office of the late Ben Zion
D. Oliensis (widely known appellate attorney) ; member of the editorial staffs of a number of trade
publications; author of the text book, "Labor Unions and Labor Law," which is presently in the
hands of the publishers; specialist and consultant in labor matters; lecturer on the same subject.
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the mere mention of which in "polite" quarters seems to produce horrified shudders. However, candor and sincerity in approaching the subject compels one to
speak honestly on what is generally a subject of circumlocution and covert recognition.
The dynamic and basic cause of the incessant and almost monotonous regularity of change and mutation in labor law is that its very keystone is economic
and as such lends itself as an instrument for achieving economic advantage.
Federally, of course, and almost uniformly throughout the several states, labor
law is governed chiefly by legislation rather than by decisional law. The state
and substance of this legislation, while it very directly affects the public as a third
person, receives its greatest attention from partisan quarters. If one honestly
acknowledges that there are two opposing, contending and powerful classes 1 or
economic groups exerting tremendous and interminable political pressure upon
sensitive or responsive legislators, there is at hand a simple and forthright explanation of the chameleon-like inconstancy of labor law and its acute sympathy to
political and economic vagaries.
Lest it be supposed that the foregoing is only a matter of personal opinion,
a tracing of the salient legislative trends, progressions and recessions in respectfully submitted 2 as historical and factual testimony. 3
In endeavoring to search out and correct the weaknesses and deficiencies of
the law of labor relations as it is now composed, it is, therefore, indispensible
and prerequisite that the subject be pursued in the light and with full recognition
of those ponderous and inescapable considerations which, while not recited in the
legislative enactments, are the forces which actually sire the legislation. If, as all
law presumptively does, labor law is to function as an effective code for the peaceful and beneficial guidance and regulation of the conduct of the affected elements
of our society and for the preservation and promotion of the general welfare, the
frictional and abrasive ingredients of the law must be removed and its deficiencies
supplied. A body of law which is itself provocative of disturbances and unrest
is a complete negation of the purpose and place of law in organized society and
is infinitely worse than no law at all.
At this point it is opportune to examine the existing body of labor law and
to analyze its fibre.
Disregarding legislation of such particularized and limited application as
the Railway Labor Act, 4 the Bituminous Coal Act, 5 Reemployment provisions of
the Selective Service Act,8 the newly enacted and colloquially designated "Anti'Horrible
dictu!
2
See Appendix, infra.
Sit will be found interesting and illuminating to coordinate these legislative fluctuations with
the political and economic directions of the particular period in the given geographical locality.

4Act of May 20, 1926, c. 347, 44 Stat. 577-587; Act of June 1934, c. 426, 48 Stat. 926; Act

of June 21, 1934, c. 691, 48 Stat. 1185-1197; Act of April 10, 1936, c. 166, 49 Stat. 1189; 45 U.S.
Code 151-188.

5Act of April 26, 1937, c. 127, sec. 9; 50 Stat. 87; 15 U.S. Code 839.
6Sec. 8; Act of September 16, 1940, c. 720; 54 Stat. 885; 50 U.S. Code 308.
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Petrillo" amendment to the Communications Act of 19341 and the provisions of
such temporary legislation as the War Labor Disputes Act,8 the basic tissue of the
law of labor relations 9 is comprised of the Anti-Injunction Act of 193210 and
the National Labor Relations Act of 1935."1 The two Acts, together, compose
the keystone and base of our labor law. The cardinal and operative rules of law
are chiefly derived from these two statutes' 2 and decisional interpretations thereof.
The Anti-Injunction Act, in gist, provides that except upon the specified
conditions, i3 no restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction shall be
granted in any labor dispute 14 restraining or enjoining any person or group of
persons from: 15
7

Act of June 25, 1943, C. 144; 57 Stat. 163.
8
Approved April 16, 1946; Public Law 344, 79th Congress, 2nd Sess., 47 U.S. Code, Sec. 506,
which prohibits the compulsion of hiring unnecessary employees (i.e. "stand-by" bands and the
like) ; exacting monies for services not performed or for which payment has once been received,
and kindred practises.
0We are here considering only the Federal law since an analysis of the myriad of variant and
heterogeneous rules prevailing throughout the 48 individual states would far exceed the limits of
an article such as this.
For a general resume of the rules obtaining in the several states, see Appendix, infra.
10Act of March 23, 1932, c. 90; 47 Stat. 70; 29 U.S. Code, sec. 101-115. This Act is frequently designated as the Norris-LaGuardia Act, after the names of the farmers of the Act: the late
Senator George Norris, of Nebraska, and former Congressman Fiorello LaGuardia, of New York
City.
lAct of July 5, 1935, c. 372; 48 Stat. 457; U.S. Code, Sees. 151-166.
This Act is often referred to as the Wagner Act after its sponsor, Senator Robert F. Wagner
of New York State.
12The Act of March 4, 1913, c. 141, sec. 8; 37 Stat. 738, 29 U.S. Code, sec. 511 confers upon
the Secretary of Labor the right to act as or appoint mediators in voluntary arbitration. It is under
the authority of this Act that the Conciliation Service of the Department of Labor was established.
This Act does not promulgate an efficient or operative rule of law but merely authorizes the
profert of arbitration machinery. It is not, however, incumbent upon the disputants to avail them
selves of the offer or to request or resort to the use of such arbitration equipment.
The Sherman Anti-Trust Act:-Act of July 2, 1890, c. 647; 26 Stat. 209; 15 U.S. Code, 52as it applies to labor relations merely prohibits practises which interfere with the competitive or
price aspects of interstate commerce and prescribes criminal and equitable elief in suits by the
Federal government and treble damages in civil suits. See the cases of: Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader,
310 U.S. 469; I.L.G.W.U. v. Donnelly Garment Co., t19.Fed (2nd) 892; Phila. Record v. PhotoEngravers Ass'n., U.S. Eastern Dist. Ct. for Pa., Civil No. 5202, Oct. 30, 1945. This statute, however, has no direct application to the law and conduct of labor relations and is not properly
classifiable as a segment of labor law.
The Clayton Anti-Trust Act:-Act of October 15, 1914, c. 323, 38 Stat. 730-740, 15 U.S.
Code, 12-27; 28 U.S. Code, 381-390; 29 U.S. Code 52, insofar as it relates to labor relations, deals
with the issuance of injunctions in labor disputes. This Act, however, has been superseded by the
Anti-Injunction Act of 1932.
13(a) Public Hearing
(b) Personal Notice
(c) Findings of fact by the Court that: unlawful acts have been committed or threatened
accompanied by a finding that those enjoined are guilty of actual participation, authorization cr
ratification; that substantial and irreparable injury will result; that greater injury will result from
the denial of relief than from the granting of such relief; that the complainant has no adequate
remedy of law and that the public authorities cannot or will not furnish adequate protection.
(d) filing of an indemnity bond
(e) proof of the complainant's prior making of every reasonable effort to settle the dispute.
4
1 Under the Act a labor dispute comprehends "any controversy concerning terms or conditions
of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of
whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation ot employer and employees": sec.

13(c).

15Sec. 4.
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(a) ceasing or refusing to work or compelling the continuation of work;
(b) becoming a member of any labor organization or employees association,
16
notwithstanding any agreement not to become a member thereof;
(c) paying or withholding strike or unemployment benefits;
(d) giving of lawful aid to litigants in proceedings arising out of labor
disputes;
(e) publicising facts of a labor dispute, without resort to fraud or violence;
(f) picketing and peaceable assemblage;
(g) doing in concert with others or dissuading others from doing any of
the foregoing acts.
The essential parts of the National Labor Relations Act, as augmented by
the establishment of a forum and procedures for the enforcement thereof, are
embraced by section 7, 8 and 9(a) of that Act, which said provisions read as
follows:
"Sec. 7. Employees shall have the right to self-organization,
to form, join or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of* their own choosing, and to engage in
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection.
Sec. 8. It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer(1) To interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7.
(2) To dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it: Provided, That subject to rules and regulations made and
published by the Board pursuant to section 6(a), an employer shall
not be prohibited from permitting employees to confer with him
during working hours without loss of time or pay.
(3) By discrimination in regard to hire and tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organizatioff: Provided, That
nothing in this Act, or in the National Industrial Recovery Act
(U.S.C., Supp. VII, title 15, secs. 701-712), as amended from time
to time, or in any code or agreement approved or prescribed thereunder, or in any other statute of the United States, shall preclude an
employer from making an agreement with a labor organization (not
established, maintained, or assisted by any action defined in this Act
as an unfair labor practice) to require as a condition of employment
membership therein, if such labor organization is the representative
of the employees as provided in section 9(a), in the appropriate
collective bargaining unit covered by such agreement when made.
(4) To discourage or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he has filed charges or given testimony under this
Act.
16Such contracts have inelegantly been termed "Yellow Dog Contracts"
by sec. 3 of the Act.

and are proscribed
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(5) To refuse to bargain, collectively with the representatives
of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 9(a).
Sec. 9. (a)Representatives designated or selected for the purpose of collective bargaining by the majoity of the employees in a
unit appropriate for such purpose, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective
bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment,
or other conditions of employment: Provided, That any individual
employee or a group of employees shall have the right at any time
to present grievances to their employer."
These two statutes, the Anti-Injunction Act and the National Labor Relations Act, aided by supplementary and interpretative decisions, constitute the entire
corpus of our federal law of labor relations. Whatever inequities or deficiencies
exist in the national law of labor relations are attributable to the text, operation
or silence of these enactments. It is, however, important to note that a very
considerable part of our industrial difficulties or the sources thereof, are beyond
the scope of these Acts and, consequently, may not be ascribed thereto. The
first and foremost of those considerations which are productive of industrial strife
and which lie beyond the orbit of existing labor legislation is the element of
economics. This element cannot be ignored if even a semblance of enduring
industrial harmony is to be attained. To attempt to stem industrial unrest by
concentrating solely on legal rights and procedures and remaining purposefully
oblivious of what is undoubtedly the prime and detonating element in the great
majority of industrial disputes, is akin to the impossible task of sweeping back
the ocean.
A well-phrased quotation might, at this point, serve to corroborate the
importance of the economic factor in industrial disputes, viz: "the inequality of
bargaining power between employees who do not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are organized in the corporate
or other forms of ownership association substantially burdens and affects the flow
of commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions, by depressing
wage rates and the purchasing power of wage earners in industry and by preventing the stabalization of competitive wage rates and working conditions within
and between industries."
It is interesting to note that the foregoing quotation is not the biased view
of a partial writer, but is a precise and verbatim excerpt from the "policy" provision' 7 of the national Labor Relations Act.' 8
7

1 Section 1, vide supra.
18The Anti-Injunction Act, supra, in Section 2, its policy provision, provides as follows:
"Whereas under the prevailing economic conditions, developed with the aid of governmental
authority for owners of property to organize in the corporate and other forms of ownership
association, the individual unorganized worker is commonly helpless to exercise liberty of contract
and to protect his freedom of labor, and thereby obtain acceptable terms and conditions of employment, wherefore, though he should be free to decline to associate with his fellows, it is necessary that
he have full freedom of association, self-organization and designation of representatives of his own
choosing, to negotiate the terms and conditions of his employment, and that he shall be free from
the interference, restraint or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of
"
such representatives or in collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection ..
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Governmental recognition, although niggardly, was subsequently and again
accorded to the economic element by the imposition, by the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938,19 of a minimum wage.
However, while recognizing the importance of the economic factor, neither
the National Labor Relations Act, the Anti-Injunction Act nor the Fair Labor
Standards Act make adequate provision for the elimination of that element as a
source of industrial strife. The Fair Labor Standards Act was neither devised nor
does it operate as a specific in the realm of labor disputes. Contrariwise, that Act
was intended and functions solely as "welfare" legislation. Moreover, and apart
from its ineptitude in the sphere of labor controversies, the Fair Labor Standards
Act operates unilaterally and directs itself solely to the interests of employees.
The National Labor Relations Act proceeds on the premise that the removal
of impediments to effective organization among employees will enable the latter,
by means of collective bargaining, to obtain their due. One of the greatest individual vices of this principle is that, while it may operate to equalize the employees' bargaining power with the employer's, it fails completely to remove the
economic factor as a source of exhausting industrial conflict. On the contrary,
if only by reason of the permissive strengthening of one of the disputants, the
prospect and efficacy of the economic factor as a source of conflict has been
enormously enlarged by that Act. The Act merely requires the parties to bargain
2
collectively. 0 It does not require the disputants to come to terms. ' Nor does
22
it debar non-discriminatory mass discharges by the employer, on the one hand,
or, on the other hand, strikes by employees.23 The experience of the last decade
has been that while, consonant with its avowed purpose, the National Labor Relations Act has aided in equalizing the strength and bargaining power of the disputants, it has, because of its too Lxclusive reliance upon collective bargaining,
fallen short of an adequate preventive or remedy for industrial strife. The legislative trust that men of good-will, bargaining in good faith, will assure a peaceable composition of differences has been exhibited by the prosaic, evasive and,
sometime, infamous practises of both disputants to be a trifle too idealistic to be
relied upon as a sufficient persuasion to covetous man to altruistically forego
individual commercial or group aggrandizement in the interest of public welfare.
Having by law only the duty to bargain but not the obligation of resolving their
19Act of June 25, 1938, c. 676; 52 Stat. 1061; 28 U.S. Code 1-19.

20Section 8(5) of Act; N.L.R.B. v. Piqua Munising Products Co., 109 Fed. (2nd) 552; Noth
Electric Mfg. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 123 Fed. (2nd) 887; Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp. v. N.L.R.B.,
114 Fed. (2nd) 930; N.L.R.B. v. Express Publishing Co., 128 Fed. (2nd) 690.
21N.L.R.B. v. Coleman Lumber Co., 98 Fed. (2nd) 18; N.L.R.B. v. Whittier Mills Co., 123
Fed. (2nd) 725; Continental Oil Co. v. N.L.R.B., 113 Fed. (2nd) 473; N.L.R.B. v. Westinghouse
Air Brake Co., 120 Fed. (2nd) 1004; N.L.R.B. v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 110 Fed. (2nd) 623;
N.L.R.B. v. Griswold Mfg. Co., 106 Fed. (2nd) 713.
22N.L.R.B. v. Hopkins Retinning Co., 98 Fed. (2nd) 97; N.L.R.B. v. Somerset Shoe., 111
Fed. (2nd) 681; N.L.R.B. v. Stremel Co., 141 Fed. (2nd) 317.
23Section 13 of Act: "Nothing in this Act shall be construed so as to interfere with, impede
or diminish in any way the right to strike."
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disagreements, interested disputants find the National Labor Relations Act but
slight dissuasion from conflict from which rich economic rewards or advantage
may be derived.
At this juncture one may properly ask how, within a democratic form of
government, in the interest of public welfare, it is possible to compel the consummation of peaceable agreement without abridging the fundamental rights of
the disputants. The answer, in principle if not in application, is simple. The
solution resides in a system of jury decision.
Obviously, it would be impossible within an exposition of such limited
proportions such as this to develop every minute detail of the proposal or to deal
at length with every manner of protest or disagreement. However, with full
awareness and anticipation of such partisan objections and remonstrances as:"compulsory legislation!"-"interference with rights of contract!"-"due process!"-"unconstitutional!"--et cetera, ad nauseam, the following is submitted as
a skeleton plan of a constitutional method of reducing, if not removing, along
with other vexatious elements, the frictional and provocative economic ingredient
as a source of industrial intransigency:
(1) The introduction into the National Labor Board tribunal of a "contract
and economic" division. This division would be a coordinate part of the forum
and would have the same inquisitional 24 and quasi-judicial 25 prerogatives as the
collateral brance of the tribunal. Under the present procedures of the National
Labor Relations Act only employees or their representatives may commence proceedings since the offenses possible under the existing Act-"unfair labor practises"--can only be committed by an employer and against his employees or their
representatives. 26 However, if there is taken the larger view that prevailing or
impending industrial disagreements and strife (as contrasted to unilateral violations
of the Act) impairs or may impair not only the interest of the employees, but the
interests of the employer and the welfare of the public as well, the reasonableness
of permitting proceedings, resulting from present or probable inability of the
disputants to effect an agreement, to be initiated either by the employees, the employer or the government, on its own motion, as the representative of the public.
Upon the commencement of proceedings prevailing lock-outs or strikes would
be mandatorily terminated and the status quo ante restored and retained pending
final decision of the proceedings.
The jurisdiction and functions of this newly created division of the National
Labor Relations Board would comprehend proceedings embracing the contractual
difficulties of the disputants and other kindred matters not now entertained by
24N.L.R.B. v. Barrett Co., 120 Fed. (2nd) 583; N.L.R.B. v. Carlisle Lumber Co., 99 Fed.
(2nd) 533.
25N.L.R.B. v. Prettyman, 117 Fed. (2nd) 786; Continental Box Co. v. N.L.R.B., 113 Fed.
(2nd) 93.
26Section 8 of Act, vide supra.
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the Board as it is presently composed or authorized by law. While the dignity
of the two segments of the augmented Board would be co-equal, the sphere of
their operations and the scope and extent of this jurisdiction would be individual.
By superimposing the new division upon the existing Board, there would be
avoided the chaos which might result from disembodying and reconstructing the
present Board and its expansive work.
(2) Functioning under the auspices of the "contract and economic" division
of the Board as a fact finding body would be the jury.
Juries would consist of an uneven number of jurors, perhaps eleven, thirteen
or more. While the panel would be drawn in the manner now provided by law,
because of the involved nature of the probable issues a greater liberality in the
number of peremptory challenges than is presently afforded should be allowed.
The jury would make specific findings on the particular issues submitted to it.
A majority verdict would bind the jury, the forum and the disputants.
(3) In determining the issue of wages or allied issues, tht jury would be
obliged to consider and predicate its findings on the following considerations in
connection with which it would be entitled to receive and the disputants and the
government privileged to produce factual and expert testimony:
(a) Governmental and other expert surveys and indices reflecting changes
in costs of living in the particular community;
(b) Prevailing wages paid to and received by the respective disputants;
(c) Particular employer's ability or inability to pay demanded increasts in
wages;
(d) Economic changes alleged to necessitate reduction in wages;
(e) Prevailing rates of pay for kindred work in allied or comparable industri'es by employers of like grade;
(f) Geographical or accustomed wage differentials;
(g) Communal development or retrogression;
(h) Relation of demanded increase or decrease in wages to foregoing considerations.
An indispensible necessity to a full and complete investigation of the issue
would be the right of subpoena by the Board on its own motion or upon application by the jury, the disputants or the government.
Unless agreed upon by the disputants, it would be incumbent upon a jury,
in deciding a wage issue, to fix a date to which its verdict would be retroactive
or pospectively operative.
The jury's verdict would be appealable in the manner that the findings of the
existing Regional Board's are now permitted by law, however, that such appeals
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would be given special precedence and priority on appellate calendars, as is
presently provided in the cases of temporary injunctions by the Anti-Injunction
Act.

27

(4) Dismissal of the proceedings immediately upon effectuation of a written
agreement between the disputants at any time prior to the final determination of
the proceedings.
(5) It would be incumbent upon the disputants to execute a written agreement in accordance with the jury's verdict within a given period of time from the
rendition of the verdict or the ultimate disposition of any appeal from such verdict.
(6) It would constitute an "unfair labor practise" for either of the disputants to violate any of the provisions of the amended Act or to fail or refuse
to execute a written contract in accordance with the jury's verdict. Such "unfair
labor practises" could be penalized by such devices as:
(a) Loss of collective bargaining rights and withdrawal from the offending
employee-disputant of recognition as bargaining agent.
(b) Restraining and mandatory equitable proceedings to enjoin violations
and compel execution of a written agreement.
(c) Liability to damage suits for unlawful lock-outs or strikes, employer's
damage to be measured by proveable loss; employees' damage to be loss
of wages as fixed by jury's retroactive verdict. Actions by the employer
would be permitted against all persons or organizations participating in,
authorizing or ratifying the violation. Collective or representative
actions against employer would be permitted on the employees' behalf.
As has been previously indicated, no attempt has here been made to render
a detailed presentation of a full and complete plan. All that is intended is an
essential pattern for contending with what appears otherwise to be an insurmountable obstacle to industrial concord and for which the law as it presently obtains
makes no provision.
No more is it proposed to counter the numberless objections and protest
that may be conceived by an interested and purposeful mind. It might not, however, be superfluous to note that the proposed plan is neither as novel, constitutionally offensive or as lacking in precedent or parallel or as imprudent as first
reading or an opposed predisposition might indicate.
With respect to an encountered objection that issues as involved and as intricate as those contemplated by the foregoing proposal are too complex and beyond
the comprehension of juries, it is submitted that our system of trial by a jury of
one's peers has excelled any other known or experienced vehicle of judicial trial.
Such disparagement constitutes nothing less than an affront to all of us since our
27

Section 10.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

juries are drawn from the entire populace. Each of us, even the protesting few
whose opposition reflects their distrust or disdain of their neighbors, are potentially the jurors who are assailed as incompetent to pass judgment upon matters
which, even if indirectly, so immediately and gravely affect our own individual
as well as the common welfare. Our jury system has, in truth, so well acquitted
itself in our already complex and diversified jurisprudence and society and so fully
has it vindicatgd the wisdom of the founders of the constitution in delegating
to our neighbors and equals the right of decision upon our welfare, liberty and
property, that the capacity and trustworthiness of the system has long passed beyond question or doubt. The jury system cannot be brushed aside by a mere disdainful toss of a critic's hand.
A second, and, no doubt, quite vocal objection may be heard that the proposal requires the compulsory submission of controversies for decision. The
reader is probably aware that there are, and, from time to time in the past, have
been proposed in legislative quarters various proposals for compulsory arbitration
of labor disputes. These and kindred legislative plans have and are universally
and vigorously opposed by both management and labor. Such opposition is
founded on the protest that neither side to an industrial dispute should be compelled to become a party to any engagement against their volition. It is vehemently protested by both factions that each side has the right to make its own decisions
and fabricate its own agreements; that to interfere with this right by compulsory
legislation is to abridge a fundamental right.
Upon reflection, this rationilization of their position by opponents of such
legislation, from both a moral and a legal aspect, becomes sheer superficiality.
While it is true that the disputants in an industrial controversy should and do
have the fundamental right to establish their own contractual relations and, upon
terms and agreements of their own determination, there arises a question as to
what may be the rights of disputants where it is established that the disputants
cannot arrive at an agreement. Both management and labor assert that in such
a situation it is their individual right and prerogative to abstrain from agreement
and to employ any means at their disposal to further their own particular interests, 28 even though industrial paralysis results therefrom. Obviously, it is impossible to underwrite this irresponsible doctrine either from a legal, economic or
social viewpoint. So fabulous has our industrial system and organization become
and our national economy so delicately coordinated with and dependent upon the
continuity of industrial production and uninterrupted mass employment, that the
dislocation of our national economy and the impact upon the common welfare
which results from widespread industrial strife, demands that such disruptive
conflict no longer be viewed as a matter of purely private concern but, rather, as
a problem affected with a public interest, and as such a proper subject for legislative attention.
2SBarfield v. Standard Oil Co., 14 N.Y.S. (2nd)

881.
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Much of the opposition to compulsory submission of industrial disputes to
decisive proceedings stems from the machinery and methods hitherto legislatively
proposed for such proceedings. In practically all of such proposed legislation, the
government is invested with the selection of all or some of the arbitrators. In
most of the plans heretofore proposed, it has been contemplated that the "odd"
vote be cast by a governmental agent or governmentally appointed "public member" of the variously suggested arbitration boards. Thus, the government, by
controlling the appointment of one or more of the arbitrators, or, by holding the
"balance of power," is endowed with a potent, if indirect, instrumentality for
controlling decisions. Because of the possibility of the intervention of influence
as well as because of the instability which flows from the perennial change of
governmental philosophy according to changing political constituency, both orders
of disputants take violent exception to such proposals. However, where, as in
the plan hereinabove outlined, the random-chosen jury displaces the potentially
partisan governmental appointee, who, under existing formulae, holds the decisive
vote, one of the principal objections of the disputants has been met and removed.
Another major objection which may be interposed is that the proposal constitutes an effort to regulate wages without controlling production and pricesthat, according to the rules of economics, this is an impossibility and would produce chaos. The objection is further developed by a protest that even if collateral
efforts were made to regulate prices, the result of such regulation would conflict
with our democratic system and would be unconstitutional.
Seemingly valid, these objections are actually illusory. Both objections have
no force since the foregoing proposal is neither designed to nor capable of regulating wages.
In the first instance only individual cases would be accommodated and decisions made on the basis of the given facts of each particular case. In this manner
the forcing of universal wage policies 29 which are creative of untold individual
hardship would be averted. Treating each case on its special merits would prevent
either the government80 or the disputants81 from forceably imposing a standard
wage policy with its manifold inequities and inflationary tendencies.
Secondly, the "regulation" of wages is not intended. The question before
a jury acting under the proposed plan, would not be what wages generally should
be, but, rather, whether or not the demanded increase or decrease in wages in the
particularcase is justified by the various tests32 prescribed by the proposed legislation. It may be protested that this is, in fact, a limited regulationof wages, even
though only in the particular case and hence economically impossible unless pro29As contrasted to Minimum Wage Laws.
3OAs during the war emergency it was compelled to do and for which the National Wage
Stabilization Board was created.
SIThe recent wave of strikes for the purpose of compelling the adoption of an universal wage
policy will undoubtedly be remembered.
B2Vide supra: p. 13.
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duction and prices are given consideration. This objection is sophistical and has
no validity since the relation of wages in a particulardispute to over-all production
and prices is so infinitesimal as to be non-existant. Moreover, any importance
which this relationship might conceivably bear would be indirectly reflected in
the "cost of living," a factor which the jury would, under the proposal, be
bounden in any event to consider.
An element of the proposal which without doubt would, under prevailing
conditions, draw considerable fire from management would be the jury's requirement, in passing upon a wage issue, to give consideration to the employer's ability
or inability to pay demanded increases in wages.
In treating this objection it must be pointed out that the special objection of
management emanates from the opulent times and enhanced financial condition
of most industrial employers. It is protested that to use "ability to pay" as an
index of the propriety of wage increases is, in effect, to indirectly force upon the
employer an involuntary partnership with labor. That a "partnership" of sorts
does exist between the employer and employees is, indeed, a fact. But this relationship does not arise from the element of wages. It exists in the sense that
industrial production is the result of combining capital facilities and labor. Neither
can be productive without the other. To this extent there is a "partnership." It
results from the very nature of our industrial and economic system and has no
relation to nor is it dependent upon the elements of profits or wages. The relationship exists without regard to the quantum of these elements. Nor does the
increase or diminution of these elements enlarge or diminish this basic relationship.
Accordingly, to urge that the compulsion of a "partnership" results from predicating wage scales upon profit indices is specious for the relationship obtains without
regard to profits and wages. What is in reality presented by the employer's
current objection to the test of "ability or inability to pay" is an indigenous and
quite understandable reluctance to reduce the pr6fits ofe plentiful days to meet
demands for increased wages. It must be remembered, however, that it was our
national industrial experience in less abundant times that wage scale was progressively depressed because of the employer's protested inability to pay prevailing
wages. In such times the employer displayed no reluctance to establish his
inability to pay and to use that test as a measure. If one may be guided by history
or experience, using World War I and its ensuing times as a basis for analogy,
it seems inevitable that the current national prosperity will, within the predictable
future, undergo a variously estimated degree of subsidence, and with it profits
and wages. Again guided by experience, it is an indisputable certainty that in
such a contingency, the test of inability to pay will be utilized by the employer to
decrease the then presently impossible wage scale.
The burden of established law is not only to prescribe a just code of conduct
but to accommodate the prescribed rules to contingencies within reasonable expectation and upon reasonably enduring terms. If this precept be accepted as a
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description of the function of law in our society, then, viewing the immediate
problem in its panoramic aspect, it necessarily follows that in establishing a code
of law to govern the problem, a formula should be provided which will operate
equitable in all reasonably anticipatable circumstances. Accordingly, if our proposal is to serve as a medium and aid in composing industrial strife by the elimination of the economic factor as a source of conflict, it is indispensable and prerequisite that the tests of decision which are employed be such that they be equitable, operative and mandatory in all situations.
If an equitable and uniformly operative panacea is to be achieved no heed
can be taken of such unilateral protests which stem from temporary conditions and
which are inevitably subject to reversal in ratio to degree of the inescapable change
in circumstances. The inconstancy and uncertainty which would result from
recognition of such protests would stultify any effort to find an enduring and
stable means for composing exhausting industrial difficulties.
Perhaps the most vital objections that might be presented to the foregoing
proposal have relation to the prohibition against lock-outs and strikes pending
decision of the proceedings. This provision would unquestionably receive the
most vigorous opposition of both management and labor.
Heretofore the lock-out and strike were the principal, although not the only,
weapons of combat employed by disputants in an industrial conflict. From a
historical aspect the use of these wasteful and extravagant instruments might be
condoned. In the fearsome struggles of the past for recognition and survival, on
the one side, and, on the employers' side, the determined and bitter fight to preserve intact proprietary interests and prerogatives and industrial control, the
antagonists had no alternative but to resort to whatever weapons were at their
disposal. The then present state of our jurisprudence made no provision for the
peaceable composition of labor disputes. There was no governing law whatsoever.
The disputants in an industrial conflict found themselves in the anomolous position
wherein, in a civilized society, there existed no civilized machinery for the regulation or adjustment of their deep and violent differences. This lack of law was
in itself provocation and conduced to the intensification of existing antagonisms
and bitter contests. In a circumstance where society made no other provision for
the civilized adjustment of such major and deep-rooted conflict, it was natural
that the cannibal law of the jungle should prevail. As with the development
of our industrial system, the antagonists gradually grew to gigantic proportions,
the struggle, the tensions and significance thereof heightened and increased. The
instruments of lock-out and strike, because of the concentration, continuity and
interdependence of production systems and interests, and, on the other hand, the
necessity of mass employees and the centralization of employee organization and
activity, have become weapons of prodigious force. The terrific impact of these
weapons on national welfare, however, has necessitated a re-examination of the
right of the disputants to use these destructive instruments.
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The first known effort at employee organization in America was the formation of an employees' guild by the cordwainers (cobblers or shoemakers) at
Philadelphia in 1792. The first trial involving a labor dispute was the Trial of
the Cordwainers, Boot and Shoemakers of Philadelphia in 1806 in the Philadelphia Mayor's Court. Inasmuch as there was neither legislation nor decisional
law prohibiting organization or collective activities by employees, this case was
prosecuted as a criminal conspiracy and a conviction had.
The cordwainers case set a precedent and pattern which was followed until
1842. As employees' organizations became more numerous and gathered strength,
the number of "conspiracy" prosecutions increased, with a monotonous regularity
of convictions. The "criminal conspiracy" device was employed for want of a
better legal formula, there being no other legislative or decisional regulations.
In 1842, in the leading case of Commonwealth vs. Hunt, 3 a prosecution
for criminal conspiracy, Chief Justice Shaw delivered a momentous decision in
which he held that workingmen had the right of self-organization. Although it
was only in comparatively recent times that legislative recognition of the principal
was accorded, 84 the courts, in the course of considerable litigation, began to
3
adhere to this view in increasing numbers until the rule became almost universal. 5
In 1915 the Clayton Anti-Trust Act imparted Congressional affirmation of this
fundamental precept.
The universal recognition of the right of workingmen to self-organization
eliminated the device of criminal prosecution for conspiracy as an instrument of
combat in the growing conflict of the times between employers and their employees.
To take the place of the late accustomed instrumentality of criminal prosecutions, the contrivance of combat by injunction was developed. As the labor
movement waxed and flourished, the more modish and common became the utilization of the injunction vehicle.
By the turn of the century the employer had, figuratively speaking, risen
from the status of employer to industrialist and the employee to the station of
national federation delegate. The two classes had already achieved a remarkable
measure of their present tremendous and collossal stature. Industrial systems had
by now attained nation-wide proportions and represented concentrations of prodigious wealth. The major unions had organized themselves on a national scale
and embraced ever-growing and huge memberships. Although as both industry
and the unions telescoped in size and strength they became more dependent upon
one another for existence, at the same time the diversity and conflict of their re334 Metc. (Mass.)
4

Ill.

3 Clayton Anti-Trust Act, vide supra.
35Although as late as 1912 the U.S. Supreme Court still questioned the principal and took
the position that each case must be determined on its own peculiar facts: Hitchman Coal & Coke
Co. v. Mitchell et al., 245 U.S. 229, affirming 202 Fed. 512.
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spective interests sharpened and grew more ominous. The struggle was no longer
mere scrimmage between individuals and men. Without intending misplaced
drama, the conflict, literally speaking, was between giants and as such bitter and
mortal. To accurately appraise the industrial conditions of the times one need
only recall to memory the terrible and bloody hostilities that attended the railroad
and coal strikes of a generation ago. Indeed, so ruinous, violent and blood-stained
were the industrial conflicts of the era that the intervention of militia and federal
troops was rendered necessary.
Through times such as these and not until the enactment of the subsequently
disemboweled Clayton Act of 1914, 8 was there a single national regulation bearing upon industrial relations, other than the innocuous provisions of the Act of
191387 authorizing the Secretary of Labor to act as a mediator in voluntary arbitration.
The Clayton Anti-Trust Act was itself merely negative legislation since it
did not introduce any operative rules or equipment for composing industrial strife,
but merely limited and conditioned the right to the use of injunctions in labor
disputes. Although establishing a precedent in governmental policy and patently
intended as benificent legislation, the Act was, at best, a faltering and hesitant
approach to this grave national problem. Even this timorous attempt to allay
the difficulties of the times was shortly frustrated and further diluted by decisions
of the U. S. Supreme Court which, in effect, held that the Act did not mean what
its language plainly said. By these denaturing decisions it was, inter alia, held that
the Act did not create and new law or procedures but was merely declaratory of
the existing law,8 8 that it did not alter the legal status of unions or strikes, 9 that
the Act did not operate to remove the otherwise legitimate activities of unions
from the purview of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act,' 0 that strikers were not actual2
employees and hence not entitled to the benefits of the Act." Other decisions,'
by disproportionate constructions of the Act's terms: "irreparable injury," "property" and "property rights" served to further enlarge the permissive area of injunction until the provisions of the Act were rendered almost completely ineffectual. 43

6

3 Vide supra.
37Vide
supra.
8
3 American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council et al., 257, U.S. 184 (Although, interestingly enough, the Court in the same case, said that the Act should be construed
strictly9 because it was in derogation of pre-existing law).
3 Semble.
40Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering et al., 254 U.S. 443.
41American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council et al, supra; Winkle et al v.
U.S. 291 Fed. 493; Canoe Creek Coal Co. v. Christiansen et al., 281 Fed. 559; Birmingham Trust
Co. v. Atlanta R.R. Co., 271 Fed. (2nd) 743; O'Brien et al v. Fackenthal, 5 Fed. (2nd) 389;
United Mine Workers v. Red Jacket Cons. Coal & Coke Co., 18 Fed. (2nd) 839.
42U.S. v. Railway Employees Dept., A.F.L., 283 Fed. (2nd) 479; King et al v. Weiss &
Lesh Mfg. Co., 266 Fed. 257; Great Northern R.R. Co. v. Brosseau, 286 Fed. 414.
43Report of House Committee, Report 669 and Report 821, 72nd Cong.
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No further legislation 44 was enacted until the enactment of the Anti-Injunction Act of 1932. 45 This Act, although more extensive in scope, was essentially
a re-affirmation and expansion of the Clayton Anti-Trust Act and its limitations
upon the issuance of injunctions in labor disputes. 46 Although, unlike its luckless precursor, the Anti-Injunction Act has been sustained in toto47 and its provisions given their intended effect, the Anti-Injunction Act, like the Clayton AntiTrust Act, was purely negative legislation and dealt only with the result rather
than the cause of the worsening condition of industrial strife.
Our national law at that period, insofar as industrial relations was concerned,
was almost in a primitive state. As incredible as, on reflection, it might seem,
that in a modern society as highly developed and industrialized as ours that no
civilized juridical vehicle should have been provided for forfending or mitigating
the tremendous and universal unrest that attended the bitter, internecine conflict
between two tremendous and powerful segments of that society, such was actually
the case. With awesome issues and interests as stake it was inevitable that the
law of strength and force should occupy this legal vacuum. Nothing else was
provided to take its place or fill this breathless void.
In 1933, during the course and in the depth of the longest and gravest depression this country had ever experienced, Congress enacted the National Industrial Recovery Act. 48

One of the major provisions of this Act was that 49 which

affirmed and secured to workingmen the rights of collective bargaining and
organizational activities. Although this legislation was inspired by the experience
that collective bargaining conduced to industrial peace, the legislation itself,
despite its declaration of the right and duty of the disputants to bargain collectively,
actually was provocative of industrial discord. While the Act proclaimed the
right and duty of collective bargaining, it improvidently neglected to establish
machinery therefor or a forum for enforcement of this right and corresponding
duty. To supply this deficiency following the failire of enactment of legislation
introduced to deal with the difficulty, the President, by Executive Order, on June
29, 1934, pursuant to an authorizing joint interim resolution of Congress, created
the National Labor Relations Board. 0 However, because of the inherent inadequacies of the National Industrial Recovery Act, this Board, like its pre44With the exception of the Railway Labor Act of 1926, which has application only to railway
labor disputes and has no relation to general industrial controversies.
45Vide supra.
46Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Lake Valley Farm Products, 311 U.S. 91, reversing 108 Fed.
(2nd) 436; Bradley v. Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 41 Fed. Supp. 390.
4'Donnelly Garment Co. v. I.L.G.W.U., 304 U.S. 243; Levering & Garingues v. Morron, 71
Fed. (2nd) 284; United Electrical Coal Co. v. Rice, 80 Fed. (2nd) 430; Anderella Theatre Co. v.
Sign Writers Union, 6 Fed. Supp. 164; Lauf v. Shinner, 303 U.S. 323, reversing 90 Fed. (2nd) 250.

4848 Stat. 196.

49Section 7(a).
5
OLater referred to as the "Old National Labor Relations Board." Section 2(11) National
Labor Relations Act. This Board must not be confused with the National Labor Relations Board

created by the National Labor Relations Act which extinguished the Old National Labor Relations
Board.
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decessor, proved unequal to the problem. There was available to it only an
excessively drastic, rarely imposed and, consequently, ineffectual penalty for noncompliance s' with the provisions of the Act.
On May 27, 1935, the entire National Industrial Recovery Act was unanimously declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.5 2 Although the Act,
from a legal aspect, was inexpertly drafted and failed of judicial approval, in a
broader sense it was a notable and a successful experiment. Overlooking the
provocation to industrial contention which emanated from its omissions and deficiencies, the Act was the first and a successful demonstration that, in the interests
of national welfare, regulations bearing upon contractual' 8 affairs in the realm
of labor relations could be promulgated by the government without injury to
the fabric of our democratic institutions.
On July 5, 1935, Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act. 5 '
This statute, apart from its orderliness and superior draftsmanship, corrected the
greatest single failing of the National Industrial Recovery Act. It supplied a
forum for the adjudication and enforcement of the various rights and duties
arising under the terms of the Act. However, while the National Labor Relations Act was framed with expertness and precision for the purpose for which
it was intended, the orbit and scope of the Act is too limited and restricted to
render it an adequate instrumentality for dealing with the whole problem of
industrial disagreement and strife. The Act suitably provides for the elimination
of employer interference with the collective activities of employees,5 5 a source
of considerable industrial strife. It prescribes the duty of collective bargaining
and furnishes a forum and sufficient procedural means for decision and enforcement. However, the fundamental theory of the Act is that the equalization of
bargaining strength will assure the composition of differences by means of compulsory collective bargaining, notwithstanding the absence of compulsion of
agreement. 55
While it is true that experience has indicated that collective bargaining
conduces to industrial harmony, it has also been demonstrated that collective
bargaining which does not result in agreement is no deterrent to industrial discord
and conflict.
Herein resides the vice in the National Labor Relations Act. It is entirely
dependent upon collective bargaining for its efficiency as a remedy. While the
5'Revocation of "Blue Eagles," a placard which was issued by the government to members of

industries subscribing to the particular industry's "Code"-a compilation of governmentally approved regulations of fair competition, the "Codes" being allocated by industry. A "Blue Eagle"
was the equivalent of a license to operate and the emblem was revocable for cause by regional subdivisions
2 of the National Labor Board, an administrative agency created by the Act.
6 Schektor v. U.S., 295 U.S. 493.
58As contrasted to legislation affecting judicial procedure, as in the case of the Clayton AntiInjunction Act: vide supra.
64Vide supra.
55Although itis a weakness of the Act that it operates only unilaterally.
66See cases previously cited.
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removal of undue influence and interference and the universal assurance and
protection of the right of collective bargaining are undoubtedly indispensable
factors to industrial harmony, they are only factors, especially in absence of any
compulsion to arrive at agreement. It is to be expected and it has been our
national experience that not being obliged to and being unable to come to peaceable terms, industrial disputants will resort to the rule of strength. A factor
which developments in recent post-war times has amply established to be as important as, if not more important than, the elements of "interference" and collective bargaining in industrial disputes is the economic question. Current history has clearly shown that more often than disputes result from the want of
collective bargaining, "collective bargaining" itself founders on the rocks of the
economic factor. Since nowhere in the law is provision made for this factor,
it is inevitable that industrial conflict should ensue.
Reverting to the matter of the prohibition of lock-outs or strikes pending
decision in proceedings under the proposal, it is submitted that it was circumspect
of Congress, in enacting the National Labor Relations Act, to provide that the
right of strike remain unimpaired. 57 In absence of a corresponding prohibition
of non-discriminatory lock-outs by employers, this re-affirmation of the right of
strike was eminently fair. Moreover, since no provision was made for the elimination of one of the principal causes of industrial disputes-determination of the
economic factor-and most especially because no alternative to decision by strength
was furnished by law, it was imperative that the law should not, in partiality, disequalize the strength potential of either disputant by depriving either of them of
their principal means of combat.
It is in the hope of correcting this evil, extravagant and primitive state of
law... or, rather absence of civilized law... that the foregoing proposal has been
submitted. IF the proposal of determination by jury constitutes a vehicle which
will assure impartiality, equity and that essential and ifidispensable unpredictability of decision, then there has been furnished to industrial disputants an instrument of justice which is the maximum of human capabilities. With a just and
equitable means of decision afforded by law, the rule of decision by force with
its ruinous and disruptive effect upon the common welfare, has no place in our
society. Given the means of decision by law, the disputants have no need for
decision by brute strength of lock-out and strike. In the interest of the common
welfare, their necessity for self-defense having been removed, both of these
primeval and dangerous weapons should be proscribed and their use prohibited.
Because of the assurance that decisions would be compulsorily retroactive or prospectively operative in accordance with the particular issues, facts and the justice
of the case, proceedings under the proposal would take the place of pressure and
persuasion of lock-outs and strikes and, at the same time would eliminate the
57Vide supra.
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prodigal and wasteful loss of revenue, sacrifice of wages and disorganization of
our national economics, all of which, in varying degrees, attend every lock-out
or strike.
In suggesting the prohibition of lock-outs and strikes, no sight is lost of the
fact that the government has no means of compelling either the operation of
facilities or of making unwilling men work short of measures which are tantamount, in the employer's case, to seizure and confiscation, or in the case of employees, the equivalent of virtual enslavement. Although, in enforcement of
the provisions of the War Labor Dispute Act of 1943, authorizing the President
to do so in cases in which the labor disputes impaired the war effort, plants were
occasionly seized and operated under governmental supervision, our experience
with such measures demonstrated that the instrument of seizure was not only
impracticable, if not ineffectual, but, more important, that it was incompatible
with our form of government and society. It is fully appreciated that if the
compulsory operation of inanimate production facilities is incongruous in a
democracy then the compulsion of human beings to involuntary servitude is a
thousandfold mote iniquitous. However, it is not contemplated that in prohibiting lock-outs and strikes that compulsory physical compliance be enforced,
but, rather, that there be established a rule of prohibition whose violation would
subject the miscreant to liability for proven damage or loss of wages, as the case
may be. It is submitted that such financial liability (which does not presently
obtain) would suffice to produce compliance without resort to measures which
would do injury to our constitutional institutions. If it be protested that this theory
would have no persuasion for an impecunious and upstart labor organization, it
may be noted that the prescribed withholding or rescission of such organizations'
right of representation and collective bargaining, with the employer's resultant
right to entertain relations with other groups or individuals, should be sufficiently
dissuasive of violations of the prohibition.
It should be noted that while the proposal embraces a prohibition against
lock-out and strikes, no such injunction against picketing is envisaged. While
considerations of public interest require the debarment of movements such as
lock-outs and strikes because of their injurious effect upon the common welfare,
no such necessity exists for the deprivation of the right of picketing which, the
courts themselves, have held to be no more than an expression of complaint and
as such an exercise of the right of free speech.58 In absence of the extreme
exigency such as exists in the case of lock-out and strikes, the deprivation of the
right to picket (and thus the right of free speech) would be a gratuitous and
hence, oppressive and unsupportable denial of a constitutional privilege.
Limitation of space prevents any further comment upon the variety of conceivable objections which may be made to the proposal. However, in concluding
5SThornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88; Snyder v. Milwaukee, 308 U.S. 147; Hague et al v.
C.I.O., 307 U.S. 469; Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468.
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this article, it might not be amiss to give momentary notice to the objection that
the proposal provides for compulsory contractual relations. In this connection
it may be observed that while Congress does not ordinarily possess the right to
abridge the contractual freedom of individuals, the mere fact that contractual
relations form the subject of congressional enactment does not, per se, render
the legislation unconstitutional. Congress and legislatures, in the exercise of
their police powers, have frequently enacted statutes which, directly or indirectly,
concern private contractual rights or relations. 69 If, in the exercise of the same
police power which enables it to proclaim as public utilities those businesses
which, by reason of their universality of service or by their nature or development " , are affected with a public interest, 6' congress were to affirm that contractual relations in the realm of industrial relations were, as by development
they actually are, matters affected with a public interest, its power to regulate such
contractual relations to the extent of requiring" the consummation of contracts
on the basis of the jury's findings would undoubtedly be sustained. It would
seem that this procedure would be no less constitutional than the compulsion
upon public utilities to enter into contracts and furnish universal service on the
basis of rates fixed by disinterested administrative agencies. If there exists the
right in Congress to ordain the duty of agreement, then the right of Congress
to compell the reduction of the agreement to writing is beyond question. Indeed,
even under the existing law, it has been held to be within the right of the
National Labor Relations Board to require disputants who have arrived at agreement to set their covenants forth in writing under pain of the penalties prescribed
62
by the National Labor Relations Act for failure to do so.

59

Fair Trade & Price Fixing Statutes: Max Factor v. Kunsman, 299 U.S. 198; Statutes Regulating Sales of Securities: Hall v. Geiger & Co., 242 U.S. 539; Statute Fixing Coal Prices: Highland v. Russel Car & Snowplow Co., 279 U.S. 253; Statutes Regulating Sales of "Future Commodities": Booth v. Illinois, 184 U.S. 425; State Minimum Wage Laws: West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. reversing Adkins v. Childrens Hospital, 261 U.S. 524; National Fair Labor Standards
Act: U.S. v. F. W. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 100; Opp Cotton Mills et al v. Administration,
312 U.S. 126; Statute Governing Wages of Employee of Interstate Carriers: Wilson v. New, 243
U.S. 332; Statute Regulating Miners Wages: Rail & River Coal Co. v. Yaple, 236 U.S. 338;
Statute Controlling Production & Prices of Milk: 125 Pa. Super. Ct. 483.
60As in the case of the National Motor Carriers Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 546.
61Munnv. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113.
62N.L.R.B. v. Heinz & Co., 110 Fed. (2nd) 843, affirmed in 310 U.S. 621; N.L.R.B. v.
Highland Park Mfg. Co., 110 Fed. (2nd) 632.
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APPENDIX
1941

1941 to Present

ALABAMA
No State Labor Relations Act
(a)
No Anti-Injunction Act
(b)
Striking without just cause
c)
prohibited'
2
Picketing prohibited

Same

Same

Strikes permitted only on majority
vote and upon filing of a report
with Department of Labor4 3
Sd) Declared unconstitutional
e) Supervisory and professional em-

ployees prohibited from joining

(f)

abor unions5
Declaration of right of self organization, representation and
collective bargaining'

ARIZONA
No State Labor Relations
Injunctions prohibited except in
cases of irreparabl'e injury7
Blacklisting of employees prohibited
"Yellow Dog" contracts void

(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

Same
Same
Same
Same

ARKANSAS

(a) Same
b) No Anti Injunction Act
c)
of employee
a) Blacklisting
No State Labor
Relations prohibited
Act

(b)
(c)
(d)
e)

Same
Same
"Closed Shop" prohibited
Assemblage in labor disputes
prohibited
(f) Labor unions required to register
and post $5000 bond to assure
performance of its contracts

CALIFORNIA
No State Labor Relations Act
No Anti-Injunction Act
"Yellow Dog" contracts void
Secondary boycotts prohibiteds
Blacklisting of employees prohibited

(a) Same

b) Same
c) Same
(d) Same
(e) Same

11947.
21937.
8
1943-Declared unconstitutional in A.F.L. v. McAdory, 18 So. (2nd) 810 (Ala. 1944).
4
Declared unconstitutional: Thornhill v. Alabama (1940), 310 U.S. 88.
5
1943-Declared unconstitutional: A.F.L. v. McAdory, supra.
61943.
71928.
81941.
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COLORADO
(a)
No State Labor Relations Act
Picketing and secondary boycott
5
prohibited
Limited Anti-Injunction Act' o

Expansive State Labor Relations
Act," which, however, requires
unions to incorporate and excluding as "labor disputes" controversies in which disputants 2are not
employers and employees'
(b) Repealed by State Labor Relations
Act
(c) Repealed and enlarged by State
Labor Relations Act

(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

CONNECTICUT
State Labor Relations
(a) Extensive
Act14 (Patterned after National
Labor Relations Act)
(b) Same
(c) Same
(d) Same
DELAWARE
(a) Same
State Labor Relations Act
(b) Same
Anti-Injunction Act
FLORIDA
State Labor Relations Act
(a) Same
(b) Same
Anti-Injunction Act
(c) Constitutional amendment prohibiting "Closed Shop"'1
(d) Bare affirmation of right of emand
ployees to self-organization
6
representation'
(e) Statute regulating labor unions,
and requiring the filing of financial reports and the obtaining of
a license
by union business
17
agents

No State Labor Relations A.ct
Limited Anti-Injunction Acct'B
Blacklisting of employees ptrohibited
"Yellow Dog" contracts prohibited

(a) No
(b) No
(a) No
(b) No

91935.
101935.
111945.
12This definition, of a "labor dispute," on February 27, 1946, in an extremely interesting
though not yet reported case, was declared unconstitutional as an indirect deprivation of the right
of free speech: Hennigh et al v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc. et al., District Court
of Denver City, State of Colorado Civil Actions: A-45091, A-45106, Division 1; A-45112, Division
2; A-45223, Division 3; A-45099, Division 4.
This case contains an excellent and comprehensive resume of the historical development of the
constitutional aspects of decisional labor law and of the transformation in -the judicial philosophy
and evaluation of the comparative values of property rights and individual liberties. The Reading
.of this case is heartily recommended.
131939.
141945.
151944.
161943.
171943.
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GEORGIA
No State Labor Relations Act
No Anti-Injunction Act
Strikes prohibited except upon 30
days prior notice18
Anti-picketting Act' "

(a'
(b'
c)
d

Same
Same
Same
Same

IDAHO
No State Labor Relations Act
Limited Anti-Injunction Act20
Criminal Syndicalism Act21 applicable to industrial disputes
"Yellow Dog" contracts prohibited

(a) Same
(b) Same

(c) Same
d) Same
(e) Picketing of
agricultural premises
2
prohibited'
(f) Union activities on28 agricultural
premises prohibited
(g) Labor unions required
to file
2
financial statements '

ILLINOIS
No State Labor Relations Act
Limited Anti-Injunction Act 5
"Yellow Dog" contracts void
Conspiracies
26 to boycott or blacklist
prohibited
Prior notice of strike required 27

(a)
(b)
(c)
d)

Same
Same
Same
Same
Same
Discrimination because
of race or
28
color prohibited

INDIANA
No State Labor Relations Act
Limited Anti-Injunction Act 29
"Yellow Dog" contracts void
Bare affirmation of employees right
of self-organization 80

181941.
191933.
201933.
211932.
221943.
281943.
241943.
251935.
261939.
271939.
281941.
291933.
801933.

(a) Same
(b) Same
(c) Same

(d) Same
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IOWA
No State Labor Relations Act
No Anti-Injunction Act

(a
(b

officials or 25 citizens to petition
governor for a mediation board- 1
Strikes and lock-outs prohibited
during mediation
Blacklisting
of employees pro32
hibited

(d
(e

Right of disputants or designated

(c

Same

Same
Same
Same
Same

KANSAS
(a)
No State Labor Relations Act
33
Limited Anti-Injunction Act
Blacklisting of employees prohibited
Grant of collective bargaining
right 34 to labor unions which
incorporate under state law
b)
Striking and picketing in designated
c)
industries prohibited35
State Labor Commissioner author- (d)
ized to take over and operate designated industries in interests of public welfare36

(a)

Extensive State Labor Relations
Act, which, inter alia, prohibits
jurisdiction strikes, secondary bovcotts, and requires union agents
to obtain license and labor
unions
7
to file financial reports
Same
Same
Impliedly revoked by enactment
of State Labor Relations Act,
which does not condition collective bargaining and representation right upon incorporation.
(e) Impliedly revoked by State Labor
Relations Act
(f) Same
KENTUCKY
No State Labor Relations Act
a) Same

(b) No Anti-Injunction Act
(c) Bare affirmation of right of employee organization, collective bargaining, strike and picketing38
(d) Prohibition of lock-outs and strikes
during mediation"9

Same
(c) Same
(d) Same

LOUISIANA
(a) No State Labor Relations Act
(a) Same
(b) Same
(b) Limited Anti-Injunction Act 4 0
(c) Same
(c) "Yellow Dog" contracts prohibited
311939.
821939.
331935.
841935.
351935.

861935.
371943.
8i940.
391940.

401937.
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MAINE
Same
Same
Same
Bare affirmation of right of cmand
ployees to self-organizati6n
42
representation
(e) Strikes by employees of public 4 3
utilities and railroads prohibited
MARYLAND
(a) Same
No State Labor Relations Act
44
Act slightly
(b) Anti-Injunction
Limited Anti-Injunction Act
4
extended
"Yellow Dog" contracts prohibited
(c) Same
MASSACHUSETTS
(a) Same
Extensive State Labor Relations
(b) Same
Act 4 6
(c) Same
Fairly comprehensive Anti(d) Prohibition of exaction by unions
Injunction Act 4
or other discriminaof initiation
"Yellow Dog" contracts prohibited
48
tory fees
MICHIGAN
State Labor Relations Act requiring (a) Same
mediation, prior notice of strike, an2 (b) Same
giving conditional recognition to
closed shop agreements, but imparting no49right of decision to mediation
board
No Anti-Injunction Act
MINNESOTA
Extensive State Labor Relations Act, (a) Same
requiring prior notice of strike and (b) Same
defining "unfair labor practises" as (c) Same
5
(d) Same
to employees as well as employers
(e) "Labor Union Democracy Act"Fairly comprehensive Anti5
a statute regulating unions, reInjunction Act '
quiring the filing of financial reBlacklisting of employees prohibited
reguports, and prescribing rules
"Yellow Dog" contracts void
2
lating intra-union affairs

(a) No State Labor Relations Act4
(b) Limited Anti-Injunction Act "
(c) Blacklisting of employees prohibited

(a)
(b)
(c)

(a)
(b)
(c)

(a)

(b)
(a)

(b)
(c)
(d)

411933.
421945.
481945.
441935.
451939.
461938.
471932.
481943.

491939.
501939.
511938.

521943.

(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

MISSISSIPPI

No State Labor Relations Act
(a)
No Anti-Injunction Act
(b)
Strikes against railroads indirectly (c)
6
prohibited 3
(d)
Limited prohibition of blacklisting (e)
of employees
MISSOURI
No State Labor Relations Act
(a)
No Anti-Injunction Act
(b)
Blacklisting of employees prohibited (c)
MONTANA
No State Labor Relations Act
(a)
Statute prohibiting equitable relief (b)
not available in non-union disputes55 (c)
Blacklisting of employees prohibited (d)
Labor unions exempted from operation of State Anti-Trust Laws"6
NEBRASKA
No State Labor Relations Act
(a)
No Anti-Injunction Act
(b)
Anti-Picketing statute 57

(c)

Same
Same
Same
Same
Variety of statutes severely re64
stricting right to strike or picket
Same
Same
Same
Same
Same
Same
Same

Same
Same
Same

NEVADA
(a) No State Labor Relations Act
(b) No Anti-Injunction Act
(c) "Yellow Dog" contracts prohibited
(d) Bare affirmation of employees' right
of self-organization and representation' s
(e) Lock-outs and strikes prohibited
during arbitration 55

Same
Same
Same
Same

NEW HA]MPSHIRE
(a) No State Labor Relations Act
(a) Same
(b) No Anti-Injunction Act
(b) Same
(c) Injunction proceedings in labor dis- (c) Same
putes given precedence over other (d) Same
pending cases 60
(d) "Yellow Dog" contracts prohibited
551930.
541940.
551935.
561935.
571929.
581938.
591929.
601935.

DICKINSON LATF REVIEW

NEW JERSEY
No State Labor Relations Act1
Limited Anti-Injunction Act"
"Yellow Dog" contracts prohibited
"Sympathy" strikes
6 2 by railroad employees prohibited

Same
Same
Same
Same
Statute prohibiting discrimination
by employer or labor u n i o n s
against employees or applicants
for employment for race, creed or
color 6 s

NEW MEXICO
No State Labor Relations Act
Limited Anti-Injunction Act"
Blacklisting of employees prohibited
Labor Unions exempted from operation of State Anti-Trust Act6 5

(a)
b)
(c)
d)

Same
Same
Same
Same

NEW YORK
(a) Extensive State Labor Relations Act
(Patterned after National Labor Re-

lations Act

66

(b) Extensive Anti-Injunction Act (Patterned after
National Anti-Injunc67
tion Act)
(c) "Yellow Dog" contracts prohibited
(d) Labor Unions excepted from operation of State Anti-Trust Act68
(e) Blacklisting of employees prohibited

(a) Same:
Amended to comprehend
"multiple
employer unit;" permit complaints by employers
(b) Same
c) Same
(d) Same
fStatute prohibiting discrimination
by labor unions or e m p 1o y e r s
against employees or applicants
for employment
for race, creed,
69
or color

NORTH CAROLINA
No State Labor Relations Act
No Anti-Injunction Act
Blacklisting of employees prohibited
Statute prohibiting persuasion of
employees
under contract to cease
7o
work

611941.
621937.
681945.
641939.
651929.
661935.
671935.
661935.
691945.
701939.

Same

Same
Same
Same

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

NORTH DAKOTA
(a) Same
No State Labor Relations Act
Limited Anti-Injunction Act 7
Act substantially
(b) Anti-Injunction
74
Employee associations
removed from
enlarged
72
conspiracy Act
(c) Same
Governor empowered to take over
(d) Same
and operate mines or public utility (e) "Yellow Dog" contracts void75
in case (f actual or threatened lock- (f) Bare affirmation of employees'
right of self-organization, repreout or strikes73
sentation76 and of collective bargaining
OH I0
Same
No State Labor Relations Act
Same
No Anti-Injunction Act
"Yellow Dog" contracts void
Same
Secretary of State prohibited from
Same
filing articles of incorporation containing word "union" or "labor
77
union"
OKLAHOMA
No State Labor Relations Act
(a) Same
No Anti-Injunction Act
(b) Same
Collective employee activities re- (c) Same
moved from operation of State
Con- (d) Same
78
spiracy and Anti-Trust Laws
Blacklisting of employees prohibited
OREGON
No State Labor Relations Act
(a) Same
Fairly comprehensive Anti-Injunc- (b) Same
79
tion Act
(c) Same
Blacklisting of employees prohibited (d) Same
"Yellow Dog" contracts prohibited (e) Same
84
Jurisdictional disputes not cogniz- (f) Declared unconstitutional
able as a "labor dispute' ' 8
(g) Same
Anti-Picketing Statute 8
(h) Same
82
Prohibition of secondary boycotts
Statute defining "Labor Dispute" to
those cases in which disputants
are
83
employers and employees
711935.
721913.
731925.
741943.
751943.
761943.
771937.
781931.
791940.
801940.
811940.
821940.
831940.
84A.F.L. v. Bain, 165 Oregon 183, 106 Pac (2nd) 544 (1940).

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

PENNSYLVANIA
(a) Extensive State Labor. Relations
(a) Minor modification of Act
Act89 (Patterned after National
(b) Minor modification of Act
Labor Relations Act-With minor revisions)
6
(b) Extensive Anti-Injunction Act
(Patterned after National AntiInjunction Act - With several
moderate revisions)
RHODE ISLAND
(a) Extensive State Labor Relations
Act 87 (Patterned after National
Labor Relations Act)
88
(b) Limited Anti-Injunction Act

(a) Same
(b)

Same

SOUTH CAROLINA

(a) No State Labor Relations Act
(b) No Anti-Injunction Act

(a)
(b)

Same
Same

SOUTH DAKOTA

(a) No State Labor Relations Act
(b) No Anti-Injunction Act

851937.
861937.
871941.
881939.
891945.
901945.
911943.
921943.

(a) Same
(b) Same
(c) Statute prohibiting
closed shop
89
agreements
(d) Constitutional amendment providing "the right of persons to
work shall not be denied or
abridged on account of membership or non-membership in any
labor union or labor organization" to be voted upon at next
general election 90
('e) Statutes regulating labor unions
and requiring financial statements
to be filed with S e c r eta r y of
State9 '
(f) Boycott or picketing of agricultural products
or premises pro92
hibited

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

TENNESSEE
(a) No State Labor Relations Act
(b) No Anti-Injunction Act

(a) Same.
(b) Same
(c) Indirect affirmation of employees'
right of self-organization, representation
and collective bargain93
ing
TEXAS

(a) No State Labor Relations Act
(b) No Anti-Injunction Act
(c) Affirmation of employees' right of
self-organization and "peaceful persuasion" 9 4
(d) Right of Governor to declare martial law in event of interference
with common carriers.
(e) Statute defining as unlawful assembly the convention, in aid of a labor
dispute, of more than one person
near a place at which such labor dispute exists95 96
(f) Boycotts declared to97 be conspiracies
in restraint of trade
(g) Blacklisting of employees prohibited

(
(

(

Same
Same
Same
Same
Same
Same
Same
Statute, inter alia, regulating labor
unions, requiring the filing of financial reports with the Secretary
of State, render books of labor
unions subject to inspection by
governmental enforcement
officers
98
and grand juries

UTAH
(a)

Extensive State Labor Relations
Act 99 (Patterned after National
Labor Relations Act, with slight
modification)
(b) Extensive Anti-Injunction Act1°°
(Patterned after National AntiInjunction Act)
(c) Blacklisting of employees prohibited

931941.
941925.
951925.
961925.
971941.
981943.
991937.
1001939.
11943.

(

Same
Same
Same
Labor Unions required to register
with Indtustrial Commission'

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

VERMONT
(a) No State Labor Relations Act
(b) No Anti-Injunction Act

(a) Same
(b) Same
VIRGINIA

(a) No State Labor Relations Act
(b) No Anti-Injunction Act

(a) Same
(b) Same

WASHINGTON
No State Labor Relations Act
Fairly comprehensive
Anti-Injunc2
tion Act
Blacklisting of employees prohibited
"Yellow Dog" contracts void

(a

Same

(b) Declared partially unconstitutional as a curtailment of power of
constitutional courts
(c) Same
(d) Same

WEST VIRGINIA
(a) No State Labor Relations Act
(b) No Anti-Injunction Act

(a)
(b)

Same
Same

WISCONSIN
(a)

Comprehensive State Labor Relations Act, defining "unfair labor
practises" for both employers and
employees, prohibiting, inter alia,
breach of agreement, mass picketing, secondary boycotts, sitdown
strikes and reqjuiring unions to make
annual financial reports to members'
(b) Limited Anti-Injunction Act

Same
Same
Statute establishing permanent Industrial Commission to investigate discrimination by employers
and labor unions in employment
matters because of race, color or
creed.

WYOMING
(a) Same
(b) Same

(a) No State Labor Relations Act
(b) No Anti-Injanction Act

21935.

Blanchard v. Golden Age Brewery Co., 188 Wash. 396, 63 Pac. (2nd) 397 (1936).
41939.
51937.

